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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

Mass public shootings have generated significant levels of fear in the recent years, with many observers
criticizing the media for fostering a moral panic, if not an actual rise in the frequency of such attacks.
Scholarly research suggests that the media can potentially impact the prevalence of mass shootings in two
respects: (i) some individuals may be inspired to mimic the actions of highly publicized offenders; and (ii)
a more general contagion process may manifest as a temporary increase in the likelihood of shootings
associated with a triggering event. In this study of mass shootings since 2000, we focus on short-term
contagion, rather than imitation that can traverse years. Specifically, after highlighting the sequencing of
news coverage prior and subsequent to mass shootings, we apply multivariate point process models to
disentangle the correlated incidence of mass public shootings and news coverage of such events. The
findings suggest that mass public shootings have a strong effect on the level of news reporting, but
that news reporting on the topic has little impact, at least in the relative short-term, on the subsequent
prevalence of mass shootings. Finally, the results appear to rule out the presence of strong self-excitation
of mass shootings, placing clear limits on generalized short-term contagion effects. Supplementary files for
this article are available online.
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1. Introduction
Defined as the gun-involved killing of four or more victims
within 24 hr, mass public shootings are exceptionally uncommon events that account for fewer than 1% of all homicides
in the United States annually (Krouse and Richardson 2015).
Despite their rarity, these seemingly senseless massacres disproportionately stoke public fear and shape public policy. Nearly
half of Americans express fear of being killed in a mass shooting
(Brenan 2019), and one-third avoid public spaces and events
to reduce their risk of victimization (American Psychological
Association 2019). Widespread concern has fueled demands
for enhanced gun control, increased access to mental health
treatment, and even government monitoring of social media for
threatening messages.
Highly publicized events can influence future occurrences of
similar episodes in multiple ways. With respect to mass killings
in particular, notorious cases have been shown to inspire others
who may empathize with the assailant or simply seek their own
opportunity for fame (Langman 2018). Often referred to as a
“copycat effect” (see Coleman 2004), this process of imitation
is typically substantiated through isolated anecdotes (Helfgott
2015). In contrast, the term “contagion” characterizes the more
general spread of a phenomenon through a population identified by patterns in the statistical rate of events (Fagan et al. 2007).
With respect to contagion, various statistical methods have
been employed to study the clustering of homicides and other
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violent crimes across temporal and spatial dimensions. Several
studies have relied on self-exciting point process models, such
as the Hawkes process and its derivatives, which predict the
future occurrence of crime based on the incidence of past events
and other factors (see Mohler et al. 2011). These models can
separate “epidemic” crime—that which is diffused across space
and time by contagion effects—from “endemic” or background
crime, which may also exhibit spatiotemporal clustering, but is
triggered spontaneously (see Reinhart 2018). Mohler (2014), for
example, examined gun crime data for Chicago and found that
a model incorporating self-excitation contagion effects outperformed ones considering only correlative effects, such as fixed
“hotspot” maps (see also Mohler 2013). Loeffler and Flaxman
(2018) analyzed shootings data for Washington, DC based on
the city’s acoustic gunshot detection system, concluding that
epidemic violence was far rarer than endemic violence and,
therefore, that any contagion effects must be relatively small.
When applied to frequent and spatially dense crime types,
point process models can be used to estimate temporal
and spatial effects simultaneously. However, mass shootings—
particularly those with large numbers of fatalities—are lowfrequency events offering relatively small sample sizes that
make the identification of both temporal and spatial effects
challenging. However, the widespread national media attention often given to these events would make spatial effects
less pronounced. Further supporting the notion of nationalized
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reaction, public opinion research (e.g., Barney and Schaffner
2019) has revealed only weak or nondetectable local effects on
public attitudes following mass shootings.
1.1. The Contagion of Mass Killing
Recent research on the media’s influence on homicide has centered on one of its most extreme and visible manifestations—
mass shootings—largely in response to growing public concern
and suggestions of an emerging epidemic (see, e.g., Follman
2014). With the media as a catalyst, contagion can be seen in
two distinct forms. Copycatting, which Langman (2017) has
characterized as “specific contagion,” reflects cases in which a
highly publicized mass shooter is adopted as a role model by
an assailant who attempts to carry out a similar act of carnage.
By contrast, “general contagion” operates when an assailant perceives such attacks as being somewhat commonplace, thereby
facilitating a similar act.
Moving beyond anecdotal accounts of copycat behavior, several studies have empirically evaluated the overall contagion
of mass murder, however, with mixed outcomes (Gould and
Olivares 2017). In one of the earliest studies, Stack (1989) found
that network TV news coverage of multiple murders (defined as
two or more victims killed in one day) did not impact suicide or
homicide rates.
More recently, Towers et al. (2015) used a self-excitation
modeling strategy on both school shootings and mass killings,
concluding that incidents are temporarily contagious for
approximately two weeks, producing an average of 0.2–0.3 subsequent attacks. Despite the fact that Towers et al. (p. 9) explain
that their work was motivated by the hypothesis that media
attention mediates the contagion effect, their widely reported
claim of a short-term contagion was advanced without any
attempt to include a measure of media coverage in the models.
As such, it must be assumed implicitly that all school and mass
shooting incidents receive substantial national coverage and that
all types of mass shootings are equally contagious. While individuals may imitate the actions of someone similar with whom
they can identify (Huesmann and Taylor 2006), it is questionable
that, for example, a middle-aged man who annihilates his family
would inspire a teenage school shooter or a gangster to execute
his rivals.
Although a few mass killers are ubiquitously known due
to their infamy, most are relatively obscure, with coverage of
their crimes largely limited to local news stories. Duwe (2004),
for example, found that only 45% of all mass killings in the
United States between 1976 and 1999 were reported in The New
York Times, often regarded as the nation’s “paper of record.”
Accordingly, two studies replicating the work of Towers et al.
(2015) with the same data found no evidence of contagion
when mass killings were disaggregated by type—public, family,
and burglary/robbery (King and Jacobson 2017)—or when a
measure of public attention (via Google Trends) was considered
(Lankford and Tomek 2018). In response, Towers et al. (2018)
argued that the discrepancies in results are related to their use of
unbinned methods, which increase the model’s power to detect
significant effects. In any case, to the extent that contagion is
operative, it would be more pronounced in connection to widely
publicized mass shootings in public settings, as opposed to those

that occur in private residences or that are related to ongoing
criminal activity.
Prior research has also documented contagion effects for
less lethal acts in schools and other public spaces, with varying
claims about their role in instigating future attacks (Kissner
2016; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2018; Jetter and Walker 2018).
Utilizing data on individuals actively engaged in killing or
attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area (socalled “active shooters”), Kissner (2016) found that the risk of an
active shooter event increased by 27% for each event occurring
in the preceding two weeks. Curiously, Kissner did not find a
significant effect for shorter time periods (e.g., one week) and
the result for the two-week period was only marginally significant at the 10% level. More recently, Jetter and Walker (2018)
examined the impact of ABC World News Tonight coverage of
shootings on the subsequent likelihood of shootings with at
least four victims killed or injured, using deaths associated with
natural disasters as an instrumental variable. Although this halfhour news program typically has a viewership of about 8 million,
they found that the 3.7% average airtime coverage of shootings
explained 58% of the variation in mass shootings.
Consistent with the evidence described above, quantitative
studies have identified short-term contagion related to school
shootings. Kostinsky et al. (2001) and Simon (2007) found
that school bomb threats spiked significantly in the wake of
the 1999 Columbine High School massacre, although it is
unclear whether the threats themselves increased or that authorities were just more apt to take notice of vague references
to Columbine in the weeks following the shooting (Fox and
Burstein 2010). Finally, focusing on social media as a vehicle
for contagion, Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2018) concluded that the
probability of a school shooting doubles when tweets mentioning the words “school” and “shooting” increase from 10 per
million to 50 per million during the preceding week. However,
they failed to identify a contagion effect with respect to mass
shootings outside of the school context.

2. The Present Study
Although researchers have documented certain sensational
homicides that inspired copycats, only a few studies to date have
focused specifically on the statistical contagion of mass murder,
particularly mass shootings with large numbers of fatalities. As
a whole, this burgeoning body of literature suffers from several
key limitations, which may explain the contradictory findings.
First, some studies assume that the public is generally aware
of all mass killings, despite evidence that most do not make
national news (Duwe 2004). In addition, failing to account for
transmission in the form of publicity may skew results in favor of
finding evidence of contagion, since incidents may be clustered
in time but not necessarily as a result of direct imitation or
general contagion (Towers et al. 2015; Kissner 2016; Towers et al.
2018). Albeit a secondary concern, the studies that do include
measures of publicity typically rely exclusively on a single outlet
(e.g., newspapers, television, or social media), which may not be
indicative of all media coverage (Stack 1989; Garcia-Bernardo
et al. 2018; Jetter and Walker 2018; Lankford and Tomek 2018).
Furthermore, there is no universally accepted definition of mass
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shooting, leading researchers to conflate more inclusive constructs with the most extreme events. Most studies invoking the
traditional definition of mass murder (four or more killed in a
single incident), for example, fail to find contagion effects (King
and Jacobson 2017; Lankford and Tomek 2018), while those
employing broader definitions often do (Kissner 2016; GarciaBernardo et al. 2018; Jetter and Walker 2018;). Finally, with the
exception of King and Jacobson (2017), prior work has failed
to account for the (dis)similarity of events, essentially assuming
that all types of mass killings are equally contagious, despite
evidence to the contrary.
By addressing these limitations, the current study advances
the literature on the contagion of mass shootings by (i) using
multiple measures of news coverage, including 16 major daily
newspapers, the Associated Press (AP) national wire, and network television news broadcasts; (ii) emphasizing those incidents most likely to be inspire others, especially high-fatality
mass shootings in public settings; and (iii) using robust analytic
methods to identify the interconnections between mass shootings and news coverage of the topic.
2.1. Data Sources and Variables
There is much confusion and disagreement surrounding the
definition of the term “mass shooting,” not to mention debate
over its prevalence and trends (Fox and Levin 2015). Specifically,
there is no consensus concerning the appropriate victim count
threshold, whether that threshold should be based on fatalities
alone or all victims both deceased and surviving, and whether
cases should be excluded based on victim–offender relationship,
motive or location. At least for the purpose of examining the
newsworthiness and potential contagion of mass shootings, it
is reasonable to focus the analysis on those cases that indeed
receive the most publicity, specifically mass shootings with large
numbers of fatalities and especially those that occur in public
locations. Indeed, these are the kind of mass shooting incidents
that scare Americans the most, as they can occur at any time, at
any place, and to anyone.
We define a mass public shooting as an incident with at least
four victims fatally shot in a public location within a 24-hr
period and absent of other criminal activity, such as robberies,
drug deals, and gang conflict. The specific inclusion rules are as
follows: (i) at least four of all victims were killed by gunfire; (ii)
at least four of the victims were killed in a public place or else at
least half of all fatalities occurred in a public place; and (iii) the
shooting did not occur in a private residence, although those in
a nonprivate residence (e.g., group home or motel) are included.
After compiling a list of all cases from nine available databases,1
we evaluated each incident to determine if it qualified as a mass
public shooting by the criteria indicated above. For purposes of
comparison, we also assembled data on all mass shootings with
at least four victim fatalities, regardless of location or type. As a
result of this case-by-case assessment, we identified a final list of
1

The data sources used to cull the pool of potential cases came from
various organizations and individuals: the Associated Press/USA
Today/Northeastern University Mass Killing Database; the FBI’s Active
Shooter Events; the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports; The
Washington Post; Mother Jones; Everytown for Gun Safety; the Stanford
University Geospatial Center; Grant Duwe; and Louis Klarevas.
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89 mass public shootings (MPS) and 503 mass shootings (MS)
more generally from 2000 through 2018 that resulted overall in
694 and 2571 victim fatalities, respectively.
Several measures of media coverage were constructed by
consulting two electronic news archives for print and broadcast
stories related to the topic of mass shootings. We searched
the “Major Newspapers” and “Associated Press Domestic Wire”
sources in Nexis® using a set of eight alternative phrases (“mass
shooting,” “mass killing,” “rampage killing,” “shooting massacre,”
“mass murder,” “mass shooter,” “mass murderer,” and “mass
killer”) to avoid any biases related to the changing ways in
which news agencies tended to characterize mass shootings. A
total of 16 major daily newspapers were consistently included
in Nexis® throughout the 19-year time frame, and these were
then weighted by their circulation figures.2 Because this group
of daily newspapers is dominated by east coast publications (e.g.,
three in New York City and three in Pennsylvania), the AP
national wire provided a useful check on any regional biases
in major newspaper coverage of events. We also searched the
Vanderbilt Television News Archive using more generic terms
(“shooting” and “shooter”) to ensure a sufficient volume of stories from the limited array of networks included in this resource.
For the study of media contagion, we generated day-by-day
tallies from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2018 of the
number and lengths of news stories in major daily papers (MP),
the AP national wire, and network television news broadcasts
(TV) on the general topic of mass shootings. These daily counts
of media content were then merged with a binary indicator of
whether there was a mass shooting on each date (there was never
more than one) and, if so, the number of victims killed.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the 6940 daily counts
for the news and mass shooting variables. As shown, all variables
were heavily skewed. Not surprisingly, the five dates with the
most news coverage were following the two largest incidents:
the June 12, 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando and the
October 1, 2017 shooting during an open-air music festival in
Las Vegas. Because the story counts and lengths were quite different in magnitude across the three news sources, many of the
analyses to follow are based on standardized values for the sake
of comparability. Also, because of the strong Spearman’s rankorder correlations between story counts and their aggregate
lengths (0.96 for MP, 0.99 for AP, and 0.97 for TV), from here
on we focus only on story counts to avoid excessive redundancy
in results.3
As also shown in Table 1, the 18% share of mass shootings
that occurred in public settings tended to claim much larger
numbers of victims: 7.8 on average for the 89 MPS compared to
5.3 for the entire pool of 487 MS. The greater lethality of MPS in
addition to the fear associated with shootings that target victims
2

The 16 newspapers were The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The Daily Oklahoman, The Detroit News, The Minneapolis Star Tribune, The New York Daily
News, The New York Post, The New York Times, The Orange County Register,
The Philadelphia Daily News, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Pittsburgh PostGazette, The San Diego Union Tribune, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, The Tampa
Bay Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today.
3
Pearson’s correlations were nearly as strong for MP (0.92) and AP (0.89), but
smaller for TV (0.46). In the latter case, some extreme outliers (e.g., special
reports of extended length on a few mass shootings) suppressed the
product-moment correlation between daily story counts and aggregate
lengths.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for MPS and MS and daily news coverage, 2000–2018.
Variable
Mass public shooting incidents (MPSincs)
Mass public shooting victims (MPSvics)
Mass public shooting victims per incident
(MPSvics_per)
Mass shooting incidents (MSincs)
Mass shooting victims (MSvics)
Mass shooting victims per incident (MSvics_per)
Major newspaper stories (MP_count)
Major newspaper words (MP_length)
AP wire stories (AP_count)
AP words (AP_length)
TV stories (TV_count)
TV seconds (TV_length)

Minimum

Maximum

0
0
4

1
58
58

0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
58
58
206
155,602
33
42,088
27
108,970

Mean

Standard deviation

Skewness

0.013
0.100
7.798

0.113
1.299
8.506

8.662
26.951
4.197

0.070
0.370
5.280
3.700
3,394.075
0.448
375.640
1.030
270.150

0.268
1.719
4.029
8.154
7300.705
1.255
1390.279
1.796
1768

3.653
12.690
8.651
10.172
7.358
7.852
11.143
3.911
40.726

N = 6, 940 days, 89 MPS incidents, 487 MS incidents.

more or less indiscriminately would tend to make these incidents especially newsworthy and, thus, potentially contagious
(see Duwe 2000; Fox et al. 2020).

3. Results
The analytic results are divided into two parts. First, we display
trends in mass public shootings and news coverage across the
19-year time frame, along with an examination of the average
levels of news coverage leading up to and subsequent to mass
shooting incidents. The second section then presents results
of multivariate point process models of the self-excitation and
cross-excitation of mass shootings and related news coverage.
Finally, while the emphasis is on mass public shootings in light
of the more extensive news coverage of these events (Duwe,
2000), the initial analyses are repeated for the collection of all
mass shootings to take advantage of their greater frequency of
occurrence.
3.1. Trends and Patterns in Mass Shootings and News
Coverage
The growing awareness and concern associated with mass
shootings raises the question as to whether there has been a
genuine increase in risk or mainly a greater extent of unsettling
news coverage. Figure 1 displays day-by-day patterns in the
number of victims fatally shot in MPS along with the three
measures of media coverage. For the first decade or so, there
was no apparent change in the prevalence or severity of MPS.
Since 2012, however, MPS incidents have increased in number
and severity; 11 of the 14 incidents with double-digit death tolls
and 4 of the 5 with more than 20 killed occurred since 2012. The
figure also reveals clustering of cases in close temporal proximity
during 2012 and 2018. It came as little surprise, therefore, that
the annual survey of AP editors named mass shootings as the top
story of both those years (see Crary 2012, 2018). The extent of
news coverage of mass shootings has also increased since 2012,
especially in the form of network television news reports, as
reflected in the bottom panel of the figure.
The surge in the incidence and severity of MPS, as well as
media coverage of the general topic, raises a fundamental question: Is the heightened news reporting encouraging more people
to commit MPS or is the increasing carnage producing more
news coverage as a response? Figure 2 specifically addresses

this matter by focusing on the average news coverage in the
30 days prior to (i.e., lags −30 through −1) and the 30 days
after a mass shooting (leads 1 through 30). Clearly, there is
no increase in news coverage with respect to all three media
sources in the days prior to a mass shooting. Not surprisingly,
MPS do spark a surge in subsequent coverage, with spike and
dissipation patterns varying by news medium (notwithstanding
the different scales to the three news coverage measures).
The peak in average major newspaper (MP) coverage does
not occur until Day 2 following a shooting. Given that these
daily papers publish in the early morning hours, there is no
increase in news coverage of the topic on Day 0—the same day
as a mass shooting. Day 1 shows some increase: Whether a
particular morning paper carries a story about a mass shooting
the previous day depends on the time of day when the incident
took place and the newspaper’s time zone. For example, an
east coast newspaper will not have any coverage of a nighttime
shooting at a location in the west coast (such as the November
7, 2018 Borderline Bar and Grill shooting in Thousand Oaks,
CA, that occurred at 11:20 pm PST) until Day 2. As for the
AP national wire, the time lapse after a mass shooting until a
wire report appears online may be just a matter of several hours.
Thus, there is an increase in AP coverage of events on Day 0.
However, the peak emerges on Day 1, as wire stories concerning
nighttime shootings may not run until the next day. Finally,
because of the availability of live video feeds by means of satellite
trucks and helicopters, television networks can broadcast an
event in rather short order. For example, TV cameras were on
the scene of the December 14, 2012 Sandy Hook school shooting
in time to capture powerful images of young children being led
away from the building with tears still fresh in their eyes. The
quick response time for television is then reflected in the peak
occurring on the day of a shooting.
For all three news sources, the surge in coverage dissipates
gradually as the days advance following a mass shooting. However, the pace at which this occurs varies by source of coverage.
Given the number of news outlets in the MP grouping, as well
as the number and variety of articles printed in daily papers, the
increased focus on mass shootings remains somewhat elevated
for about two weeks after an incident. In contrast, network
television coverage slows to normal levels within about a week.
After all, there are a limited number of networks and a limited
amount of time they can devote to news, as well as many other
topics competing for airtime.
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Figure 1. Daily major papers (MP), AP wire (AP), and network television news (TV) coverage with MPS victim count.
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Figure 2. Daily major papers (MP), AP wire (AP), and network television news (TV) coverage before and after MPS (solid line set at the overall mean).

While the impact of MPS on related news coverage is clear
and measurable, the effect of media coverage on future incidents
is complicated by the rarity of this type of crime. Over the
19-year time frame, on average fewer than five mass public
shootings occurred annually, for an average interval of 78 days

between incidents. Therefore, a 30-day or even longer window
may not detect an effect. As an alternative, mass shootings of
all types (including family annihilations and felony-related mass
killings) occur, on average, nearly twice monthly, and these were
the basis for the analysis by Towers et al. (2015) that revealed a
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Figure 3. Daily major papers (MP), AP wire (AP), and network television news (TV) coverage before and after MS (solid line set at the overall mean).

short-term contagion of about two weeks. As shown in Figure 3,
the same general pattern of news coverage appears surrounding
all mass shootings as did for exclusively public ones. Again,
there is no run-up in coverage prior to MS, but certainly a
surge in reporting in the aftermath. Whereas the shapes in
Figures 2 and 3 are similar, the peak is less pronounced for MS

generally (a two-fold increase as compared to the four-fold jump
for public shootings) and the dissipation is somewhat speedier.
This reflects the fact that nonpublic mass killings, which represent the overwhelming majority of cases, produce far less news
coverage than public massacres. In fact, as shown in Figure 4,
incidents of nonpublic mass shootings have no appreciable effect
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Figure 4. Daily major papers (MP), AP wire (AP), and network television news (TV) coverage before and after non-public MS (solid line set at the overall mean).

on the level of related news coverage. Furthermore, in terms of
the potential for contagion, nonpublic massacres are typically
precipitated by internal forces—family massacres by domestic
discord, felony-related shootings by profit-seeking, and gangrelated incidents by turf concerns (Fox et al. 2019). By contrast,
media coverage as a precipitant, to the extent that it exists,

would more likely be seen in the public shootings of innocent
strangers and random bystanders. Thus, in what follows, models
of the timing and interconnectedness of news coverage and mass
shootings will focus only on incidents in public settings (results
for all mass shootings are generally similar and available upon
request).

STATISTICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

3.2. Multivariate Point Process Models of MPS and News
Coverage
Building upon the basic lead/lag patterns presented above, we
next applied a multivariate (or “marked”) self-exciting discrete
time point process model to examine the interdependency
between media coverage and both the incidence and severity of
MPS.4 In this generative Bayesian model, we infer the contagion
properties of a point process network wherein the occurrence
of one event type (such as a MPS) may excite a heightened
probability of future events of the same class according to a
fitted impulse response function, and may also cross-excite a
higher probability of other event types (such as media coverage)
occurring over the same time period.5
Our model is highly flexible to learn trends from the data
without constraining the nature of the excitation effects; in
particular, we fit a nonparametric impulse response function
rather than assuming exponential decay (see, Towers et al. 2015).
Furthermore, by integrating a random graph model (see Linderman and Adams 2015), we allow for structured correlation in the
prior probability. This pools information across the excitation
dependencies of the event-type variables, rather than assuming that all pairwise variable dependencies have a priori equal
probability distributions. Details on point process models are
provided in the technical appendix.
The nonparametric impulse response function hk →k represents how much each event from one process (k ) excites another
(k) over time. It is composed of 20 raised cosine basis elements
distributed across lags d from 0 days to a maximum value
denoted Dmax . To enable inference on the impulse response
of self- and cross-excitation of shooting incidence and media
coverage, Dmax must be set to a value commensurate with the
timescale for excitation. We identified two relevant timescales
as (i) the average inter-arrival time between incidents (78 days
for MPS) and (ii) the timescale for coverage following an event
(typically 14 days, see Figure 2). As a result, we estimated
models with Dmax equal to 30 days (“short timescale”) and
then 365 days (“long timescale”); see the appendix for further
discussion of sensitivity to this parameter.
Last, we define some useful statistics on the weighted impulse
response function, hk →k , to summarize the strength of excitation. We set an upper limit on the excitation effect based on
the 97.5th percentile value inferred from the Bayesian model
posterior, Hmax = max(hk →k,97.5th [d]). Because the coverage
variables are standardized, the impulse response function for
self- or cross-excitation of/by media coverage has an arbitrary
unit scale. For the self-excitation of MPS, Hmax represents the
4

The U.S. population growth is not controlled for in this model; because
population grows as a smoothly varying function on long timescales
(years/decades), it would not be a significant confounder with temporal
contagion effects decaying on short timescales (weeks/months).
5
We did not include a spatial component in the analyses to follow. Almost
without exception, mass public shootings with numerous fatalities become
national stories, and regional differences in the coverage are minimal (see
Fox et al., 2020). Although local coverage of nearby incidents tends to be
more extensive, there does not appear to be short-term spatial clustering
of mass public shootings. In fact, the closest shootings temporally (in El
Paso, TX on August 3, 2018, and then in Dayton, OH the following day)
were separated by 700 miles. News about the El Paso shooting would have
reached Dayton, as it did everywhere in the United States, but the source
would not have been the El Paso Times.
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maximum number of future occurrences of event-type k that is
excited for each occurrence of event-type k per day.
Since h, as defined, is positive-definite, we can say that it is
significantly different from zero if its median value is greater
than the difference between its 16th and 84th percentile values
(the “one sigma” range of its distribution). Accordingly, we
define a significance statistic SH = H50th /(H84th −H16th ), where
the subscripts denote percentile values. This criterion for significance is similar to observing that the mean value is SH standard
deviations away from zero, but accounts for the positive-definite
and nonsymmetric distribution of the posterior.
In total, we fit a variety of independent models addressing
different data and model configurations. For the purpose of
comparing the impulse response functions across variables, the
three news coverage measures (MP, AP, and TV) were rescaled
by dividing out their standard deviation and then rounding to
integer values. The key statistics defined above are summarized
for each model in Table 2, as described in the following subsections.

3.2.1. Two-Variable Models for MPS for Short and Long
Timescales
First, we consider a simple two-variable model consisting of
the daily count of MPS and the level of media coverage characterized by each of the three metrics with Dmax = 30 days.
Figure 5 shows the weighted impulse response functions of the
model (the functions hk →k [d]) with each of the three types of
media coverage represented as columns of the figure. Each line
represents the posterior median of the function, with shaded
regions indicating the associated 95% posterior interval.
The results suggest, first, that there is essentially no excitation
effect on MPS (Hmax < 0.002). The impulse response functions
acting on the MPS variable (top row of Figure 5) are statistically indistinguishable from zero (SH < 0.01), for the selfexcitation of MPS on both subsequent MPS and the excitation
of coverage on shootings. The modest number of MPS (89
over the 6940 observation days) limits the statistical power of
the analysis. However, the Bayesian modeling approach allows
for a robust characterization of the upper limit of underlying
contagion effects through the Hmax statistic. We further explore
the dependence of our modeling on sample size in the technical appendix, concluding that self-excitation effects larger than
one excited event per four MPS would be detectable given the
available data.
Second, the cross-excitation effect of MPS on media coverage
(solid blue lines in the bottom row of Figure 5) is strong (Hmax ≈
0.4 − 0.5) and highly significant (SH > 2), consistent with
earlier results. Note that the impulse response function is fitted
with a nonparametric method and thus is not constrained to
have an exponential shape or to decay monotonically, although
the fitted results do resemble exponential decay, falling by an
order of magnitude effectively to zero after three days. The
timescale of the fitted impulse response is sharper than the
observed time distribution of media coverage shown previously
in Figure 2 because of the additional self-excitatory component. The structure of the model is such that MPS directly
impact coverage levels in the following three days, and that
coverage propagates forward in time and triggers subsequent
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Table 2. Upper limits and significance statistics of MPS and coverage excitation effects for the multivariate point process models
Effect on

Model type

Media
type

Timescale

Effect of

Statistic

Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Two variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable
Three variable

MP
MP
AP
AP
TV
TV
MP
MP
AP
AP
TV
TV
TV
TV
TV
TV
TV
TV
TV
TV
MP
MP
AP
AP
TV
TV
MP
MP
AP
AP
TV
TV
MP
MP
AP
AP
TV
TV

Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Long
Long
Long
Long
Long
Long
Long
Long
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short
Short

Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
Shootings
Shootings
Shootings
Shootings
Shootings
Shootings
Coverage
Coverage
Shootings
Shootings
Coverage
Coverage
Shootings
Shootings
Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
Coverage
High severity shootings
High severity shootings
High severity shootings
High severity shootings
High severity shootings
High severity shootings
Low severity shootings
Low severity shootings
Low severity shootings
Low severity shootings
Low severity shootings
Low severity shootings

Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH
Hmax
SH

coverage by self-excitation. That leads to the third conclusion: that the self-excitation of coverage (Hmax ≈ 0.3 − 0.4)
has a magnitude and timescale comparable to the excitation
from the shootings themselves, and this behavior is consistent
across the three media types. Last, the magnitude of excitation is similar across all three media types, although somewhat smaller for AP stories, similar to the observations of
Figure 2.
Figure 6 illustrates the nature of this model, showing the rate
function of each variable over time, λ(t), alongside the observed
rate of MPS events, zoomed in on a narrow time window
surrounding the shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist
Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC. The plot reveals how the
shooting immediately triggered major paper (MP) coverage
(in print the following day) and how that, in turn, triggered
additional coverage by self-excitation.
We repeated the analysis over longer timescales, with Dmax =
180 days. This tests the possibility that self-excitation of mass
shootings occurs over longer periods of time, given that these
events have an average inter-arrival time of 78 days. The results
of this model are essentially equivalent to those of the Dmax =
30 days model. In particular, there is no significant self- or crossexcitation of MPS at any timescale.

Shootings

Coverage

Highseverity
shootings

0.00018
0.00703
0.00014
0.00565
0.00010
0.00814
0.00161
0.00812
0.00194
0.00715
0.00141
0.00498
0.00002
0.00632
0.00031
0.00618
0.00004
0.00414
0.00308
0.00049
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

0.46019
9.80646
0.27891
5.57367
0.33971
10.42222
0.75036
3.28462
0.51325
2.46947
0.75254
2.42404
0.12107
14.13551
0.32999
2.29154
0.12712
14.33748
0.05711
1.05653
0.42186
7.55905
0.26416
5.63862
0.33610
9.95017
1.80285
3.41898
1.91932
3.72031
1.66999
2.67964
0.04952
0.16068
0.02668
0.00021
0.03917
0.00105

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.00012
0.00538
0.00011
0.00563
0.00004
0.00937
0.01323
0.00045
0.01265
0.00045
0.01190
0.00026
0.00358
0.00381
0.00570
0.00470
0.00539
0.00228

Lowseverity
shootings
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.00010
0.00711
0.00017
0.00487
0.00007
0.00817
0.01193
0.00043
0.01614
0.00196
0.01167
0.00040
0.00098
0.00585
0.00089
0.00586
0.00088
0.00291

3.2.2. Three-Variable Models for MPS on Short and Long
Timescales
Finally, we examined the role of MPS severity in terms of victim count. We expanded the model to three-variable excitatory
process networks for MPS in which the shooting incidence variable is split into higher- and lower-severity components. Highseverity shootings are defined as those with six or more victim
fatalities.6 We again find that the self-excitation of shootings
is not significant. The results for lower-severity events, which
represent the majority of incidents (N = 51), are similar to
that for the two-variable models (Hmax < 0.001), while results
for high-severity events, limited by the smaller sample size
(N = 38), have a somewhat weaker upper limit (Hmax < 0.02).7
As shown in Figure 7, the excitation of media coverage is
dominated by higher-severity shootings (orange lines; Hmax ≈
1.25 − 1.5), with the more numerous lower-severity events (blue
lines) contributing negligibly to exciting coverage (SH < 0.2).
6

This breakpoint was chosen to ensure a sufficient number of cases in both
categories and is consistent with how others have defined mass shootings
with large death tolls (see, e.g., Klarevas 2016).
7
As a natural consequence of the Bayesian probability model, the posterior
upper limit on the self-excitation rate inferred from the data are generally
of order 1/N, the inverse of the number of observations.
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Figure 5. Fitted impulse response functions for two-variable (MPS incidence and media coverage) excitatory process networks with each model (column) fit with coverage
metrics from MPs, the AP, and network television (TV).

4. Discussion

Figure 6. A limited-time excerpt of the fitted rate (blue line) of the two-variable
(MPS incidence and media coverage) excitation model using MP coverage against
the true value of each variable (black stems).

The higher-severity events are responsible for exciting coverage
at approximately three times the rate of coverage self-excitation,
and these results are similar across media types. In the technical
appendix, we explore in detail the choice of the severity threshold and certain hyperpameters of the model, reinforcing the
conclusion that there is no evidence of shootings exciting further shootings regardless of the values of these parameters.

The notion that highly publicized events may inspire the commission of future acts, both in the short-term or long-term,
has been a major avenue of recent studies of mass shootings.
Research by Towers et al. (2015) is often cited in the press as
proof of short-term contagion (see, e.g., Zarembo 2016). However, that there is some temporal clustering of events does not
necessarily mean that media coverage of mass shootings leads to
a heightened risk or additional incidents as a result. As Lankford
and Tomek (2017, p. 2) argued, “incident clusters could theoretically be attributable to many other social and environmental
factors, such as political cycles, stock market gains or losses, or
other news events unrelated to crime.” Clustering can also reflect
the operation of chance. The findings presented here, based on
analyses explicitly incorporating measures of media reporting
along with mass shooting incidents from 2000 through 2018,
suggest that news coverage does not inspire additional attacks,
at least not in the relative short-term. Specifically, although
news coverage related to mass shootings across multiple media
sources is indeed linked to excitation from high-severity events,
mass shootings themselves are distributed without significant
contagion effects in the form of either self-excitation or crossexcitation from media coverage.
Our analysis differs from Towers and colleagues in two
important respects. First, whereas the Towers model included all
mass shootings, most of which were family- and felony-related
incidents, we focused solely on public shootings, which both
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Figure 7. Fitted impulse response functions for the effect of MPS on MPs, AP, and network television (TV) coverage based on a three-variable excitatory process.

generate the most media coverage and would tend to be far more
responsive to external forces, such as the media. Next, whereas
Towers analyzed a univariate model of the timing of mass shootings, we explicitly incorporated in multivariate model levels
of media coverage, often cited as a prominent transmitter of
contagion effects. Of course, future research might consider
incorporating various exogenous factors (e.g., unemployment
rates, gun availability, and measures of social disorganization)
as well.
Notwithstanding these advances, the results reported here
are subject to certain limitations. For example, all three measures of news coverage involved traditional outlets rather than
the various types of social media. However, social media activity
with regard to mass shootings correlates strongly with more
traditional media coverage, which would argue against shortening the analytic time frame (and thus reducing the number of
incidents) to accommodate data pertaining to social media of
relatively recent popularity.8 Moreover, social media platforms
and usage have expanded dramatically over the past few years,
limiting the validity of such measures for analyzing temporal
effects.
An additional point of caution involves the impact on statistical power as a consequence of the modest number of mass public
shootings since 2000, an issue addressed in the appendix. However, it would not be fruitful to broaden the definition of mass
shooting in terms of victim type or count. As shown, non-public
mass shootings rarely receive much media coverage; the same
holds for assaults in which multiple victims are injured but few,
if any, are killed. In addition, other forms of mass shootings—
such as family massacres, as well as incidents associated with
8

Using Spearman’s rank-order correlation because of the highly skewed
nature of the data, we found that monthly counts of Tweets and Google
searches on the topic of mass shootings from 2013 through December
2018 had correlations of 0.806 and 0.834, respectively, with the major
papers (MP) measure of news coverage. In addition, an analysis of daily
Tweet counts about mass shootings before and after actual incidents
reveals a pattern that is consistent with that shown in Figure 2 for conventional media.

robberies, gang conflict, or illicit drug trade—do not receive
much media coverage beyond the local area (see Duwe 2000).

5. Conclusion
Even though there does not appear to be short-term contagion
linked to newspaper and television coverage of mass shootings,
a different form of contagion—one that is associated with the
social climate of fear—may be much more pervasive and powerful. Excessive worry over the risk of mass shootings and endless
discussions of the issue among neighbors, on social media, and
in political debate can play into the mindsets of malcontents
and hatemongers. The public’s obsession over rare, although
dreadful, events can serve as a constant reminder for angry
and dispirited individuals that the standard course of action
in response to profound disappointment and sense of injustice
is to pick up a gun and open fire on those perceived to be
responsible.
As an examination of “general contagion” rather than “specific contagion” (see Langman 2017), our findings do not
address the kind of impact that intense coverage of certain mass
killings may have on the aspirations and actions of various copycat assailants and wannabes, often years after the fact. Indeed,
there are certain types of mass shootings, such as a hate-inspired
attack on a particular class of victims or a school shooting in
response to bullying, that would have a greater potential for
copycatting than incidents involving motivations unique to the
assailant. In such cases, of course, it is unclear whether the
handful of infamous and iconic mass killers inspires others to
kill or just provides a model for how or where to kill. Whatever
the nature and source of imitation, the recent series of highvisibility mass shootings has invigorated the “No Notoriety”
movement, composed of several prominent members of the
media (including CNN’s Anderson Cooper) and a growing
number of academics (see Lankford and Madfis 2017). They
urge the news media to avoid frequently repeating the names
of mass killers or showing their images.
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The idea that the identities of people who commit unspeakable acts should themselves remain unspoken is certainly understandable. However, it is hardly reasonable, practical or even
possible for the names and images of mass killers to remain
sealed from public awareness. The name, image, as well as basic
demographic information about an assailant is newsworthy,
just as much as are descriptions of those who were killed. The
conventional wisdom among journalists appears to support and
defend such practices, according to a large-scale survey of the
working media (see Dahmen et al. 2018).
That said, the media regrettably does sometimes cross the
ethical line from stating the basic facts about an offender to
reporting on superfluous details about that the person’s life and
lifestyle. Even if media coverage does not demonstrably excite
short-term contagion effects, the news media would be wise, for
example, to limit coverage of the assailant to the essential facts
(e.g., demographic characteristics, details about the weapons
used and their acquisition, motive, and criminal justice processing), while avoiding gratuitous details about the offender’s
background and planning process that add little or nothing to
our understanding of events. Similarly, the media should only
publicize excerpts from the writings or recorded statements by
mass shooters, enough to characterize intent without giving
them a public platform for their ideas and beliefs. In addition,
a simple headshot of a mass killer is appropriate, but publishing
photographs in which an assailant has deliberately posed with
weapon in hand for effect tends to promote him or her as a
powerful individual.
Beyond these modest changes in the style of news reporting
on sensational crimes and criminals, the findings presented here
indicate that the media are not responsible for any short-term
clustering of mass shootings. Moreover, blaming the media for
various spikes in mass shootings diverts attention away from
efforts to deal with more fundamental issues, such as the value
of universal background checks, the availability of large-capacity
magazines, and access to mental health services.
The objective of this analysis was to incorporate measures
of media coverage in models of the general contagion of mass
public shootings. There are, of course, many interesting avenues
for future research on the independence of media coverage
and mass shootings. For example, what has been the impact of
reporting on breaking news stories by means of social media
platforms? What effect do the theme and tone of news stories
have on the audience and the potential for copycat attempts?
In addition, are there regional differences regarding the extent
and style of news reporting on mass shootings, particularly of
local incidents? The scholarly literature on mass shootings has
expanded tremendously in the recent years, with Google Scholar
entries regarding mass shootings having tripled over the past
decade. As the body of research on mass shootings continues to
grow, the role and impact of the media should remain a fruitful
focus of empirical investigation.
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